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In this supplement we construct an analytical framework for determining the outcome of infinitely
iterated games played between two players using arbitrary memory-1 strategies in an arbitrary,
finite action space. The organization of the supplement is as follows: In section 1 we generalize
the results of Press & Dyson 2012 [1], which were constructed for memory-1 stategies in iterated
two-player games under a two-choice action space, to the case of an arbitrary (but finite) action
space. We show that, just as in the two-choice case, a player with memory-1 can unilaterally
choose her strategy in such a way as to constrain the payoffs received by both players and, in
particular, she can enforce a linear relationship via a zero-determinant (ZD) strategy. We also
show that the result of Press & Dyson 2012 [1] on memory capacity – that a memory-1 strategy
that is robust against all other memory-1 strategies is also robust against all memory-m strategies
– holds in the case of arbitrary action spaces as well. In section 2 we construct a coordinate system
for arbitrary memory-1 strategies, which allows us to determine whether a resident strategy in an
evolving population of players is robust to invasion by a mutant. These results are a generalization
of [2, 3] to arbitrary (finite) action spaces, and to games with discounting rate δ. In section 3 we
apply these results to the case of a multi-choice public goods game played in an evolving population,
and we determine the conditions under which a two-choice strategy with access only to investment
levels C1 and C2 > C1 can resist invasion by any mutant with access to an arbitrary investment
level C. Finally in section 4 we consider the case of a game with a non-transitive payoff structure,
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such as the rock-paper-scissors game, and determine to what extent access to memory in a repeated
game can guard against loss of behavioral diversity in an evolving population.
1 Infinitely Iterated Multi-choice Games
In this section, we generalize the results of [1] to a game with an arbitrary number d of pure
strategies, which we refer to as different “choices”. We show that, in a game between two players,
each using a d-choice memory-1 strategy, either player can unilaterally choose her strategy in such a
way as to constrain the payoffs received by both players, in precisely analogy to the results of [1] for
the case d = 2. This provides a formula for the construction of zero-determinant (ZD) strategies,
which enforce a linear relationship between both players average payoffs.
We start by repeating Press & Dyson’s argument for relating the longterm payoffs for each player
in the repeated game to a determinant. The essential fact for their argument is that 1 is a simple
(left) eigenvalue for an n × n Markov transition matrix M . Recall that, for square matrices, the
left and right eigenvalues are the same and have equal multiplicities (this is easily seen by observing
that the characteristic equations for MT and M are equal: det(λI −MT ) = det(λI −M)).
Now, 1 is always a left eigenvalue of any transition matrix – because the rows must sum to
1, the vector 1 with all entries equal to 1 is a right eigenvector for the eigenvalue 1. The only
constraint to generalizing the result of [1] to more than two choices is that 1 must continue to be
a simple eigenvalue i.e. up-to-scalar multiples, the (left) eigenvector v such that vTM = vT must
be unique (for the sake of concreteness, we will normalize v so that its entries sum to 1). This is
a consequence of the Perron-Frobenius Theorem, which says that if M is a non-negative (i.e. all
entries are non-negative), irreducible matrix, then the spectral radius of the matrix (here equal to
1) is a simple eigenvalue. We recall a matrix A is reducible if there exists a permutation matrix
P such that PAP T is block upper triangular, and is irreducible otherwise. A more revealing
equivalent expression for irreducibility is that there exists k such that (Ak)ij > 0 for all i, j, i.e. the
Markov chain has a positive probability of getting from state i to state j in finite time. A two-
player game is not necessarily irreducible, e.g. the game in which one of the players always plays
the same choice they played in the previous round, and the eigenvector v need not be unique (in
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the aforementioned example, there are as many distinct eigenvectors as there are choices, in which
that player always makes the same choice). As this example highlights, since all entries of M are
non-negative, it can only be reducible if at least one entry is 0, which given their product form,
means that for one possible outcome of the previous round, at least one of the players will never
make one of the choices available to them. Thus at least one of the players’ strategies lies in the
(lower-dimensional) boundary of the set of available strategies. In particular, in the presence of
white noise, the probability of lying in this set of strategies is zero. Such noise occurs naturally if
we assume that players execute their play with some error rate (see also [3]).
Now, suppose that v is the unique left eigenvector of M corresponding to the eigenvalue 1 and
set M ′ := M − I. Then v is the unique vector such that vTM ′ = 0, so 0 is an eigenvalue of M ′.
Thus, det(M ′) = 0, and Cramer’s rule tells us that
Adj(M ′)TM ′ = det(M ′)I = 0,
from which we conclude that every column of Adj(M ′) is a left eigenvector for the eigenvalue 0,
and thus must be a scalar multiple of v.
Recall that, given an n × n matrix A, the classical adjoint of A, Adj(A) is the matrix with
entries equal to the cofactors of A:
Adj(A)ij = (−1)i+j det(A(i|j)),
where A(i|j) is the n− 1×n− 1 matrix obtained by deleting the ith row and jth column of A. We
also recall Laplace’s cofactor expansion for the determinant: for any choice of row i or column j,
we have
det(A) =
n∑
j=1
(−1)i+j det(A(i|j))aij =
n∑
i=1
(−1)i+j det(A(i|j))aij .
Now, in [1], the authors observe that if f is any column vector in Rn and (A|f) is the matrix
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obtained by replacing the nth column of A with f , then
det((A|f)) =
n∑
i=1
(−1)i+n det((A|f)(i|n))(A|f)in =
n∑
i=1
(−1)i+n det(A(i|n))fi =
n∑
i=1
Adj(A)infi
(n.b. (A|f)(i|n) is obtained by deleting the nth column of (A|f), and thus is equal to A(i|n),
whereas (A|f)in = fi by construction). Now, the rightmost expression is the dot product of the
nth column of Adj(A) with f . Now, as we have already observed, the nth column of Adj(M ′) is
αv, for some non-zero α, so
det((M ′|f)) = αv · f
for arbitrary f . In particular, recalling that all entries of v sum to 1, we have
det((M ′|1)) = αv · 1 = α
and thus
det((M ′|f))
det((M ′|1)) = v · f . (1)
Next, recall that det(A) is an alternating multilinear function of the columns of A, so for arbitrary
m, vectors f1, · · · ,fm ∈ Rn, and scalars α1, . . . , αm
det
((
A
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
k=1
αkfk
))
=
m∑
k=1
αk det((A|fk)),
and thus,
det ((M ′|∑mk=1 αkfk))
det((M ′|1)) =
m∑
k=1
αk(v · fk).
Press & Dyson then observe that player 1’s payoff is S12 := v ·R1 and player 2’s payoff is S21 :=
v·R2, whereRi is the vector of payoffs received by player i and v is the vector giving the equilibrium
rate of different plays in an infinitely iterated game. If there are 2 players, then
det ((M ′|α1R1 + α2R2 + α31))
det((M ′|1)) = α1S12 + α2S21 + α3.
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Now, to enforce relation
α1S12 + α2S21 + α3 = 0,
Press & Dyson use the alternating property of the determinant, namely that if any two columns
are equal (or more generally, if there exists a subset of columns such that some linear combination
of those columns is equal to one of the remaining columns) then the determinant is 0.
Thus, to generalize the result of [1] to d > 2 actions, we need only verify that each of the two
players can independently force the equality of at least two columns.
The first step in doing this to recal that for any matrix A, det(A) is left unchanged by replacing
any row or column by itself plus a linear combination of the other rows or columns, respectively.
Thus, if by such operations, we can transform (M ′|f) to a matrix ˜(M ′|f) with one column that
only depends on player i’s strategy, say p, then player i can enforce the linear relation (and, since
i is arbitrary, so can any other player) by setting a column that they control equal to
α1R1 + α2R2 + α31.
In what follows, we show that in the case of d choices, which we label 1, . . . , d, the transition
matrix M is such that for an arbitrary vector f ∈ Rn (here, n = d2) (M ′|f) has d − 1 columns
that are completely determined by player 1 and d− 1 columns that are controlled by player 2.
We order the possible outcomes of play by the d-ary ordering. That is to say, we denote the
event where player 1 plays choice j and player 2 strategy k by jk, and order these events such that
jk is the d(j−1) +kth possible outcome. Throughout this section, we will use d = 3 as an example
to clarify the discussion; in this case, we have possible plays
11, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32, 33
Let pijk and q
i
kj (i = 1, . . . , d, j = 1, . . . , d, k = 1, . . . , d) denote the probabilities that player 1
and player 2, respectively, use choice i, given that in the previous round player 1 used choice j and
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player 2 used choice k, so for all pairs j, k we have
d∑
i=1
pijk = 1 and
d∑
i=1
qijk = 1.
With this notation, the transition matrix M has entries
mjk,il = p
i
jkq
l
kj ,
which, for d = 3 gives us
M =

p111q
1
11 p
1
11q
2
11 p
1
11(1− q111 − q211) · · ·
p112q
1
21 p
1
12q
2
21 p
1
12(1− q121 − q221) · · ·
p113q
1
31 p
1
13q
2
31 p
1
13(1− q131 − q231) · · ·
p121q
1
12 p
1
21q
2
12 p
1
21(1− q112 − q212) · · ·
...
...
...
p133q
1
33 p
1
33q
2
33 p
1
33(1− q133 − q233) · · ·

Next, M ′ has entry m′i,j = mi,j − i,j , where i,j is 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. Again, for d = 3,
this gives
M ′ =

p111q
1
11 − 1 p111q211 p111(1− q111 − q211) · · ·
p112q
1
21 p
1
12q
2
21 − 1 p112(1− q121 − q221) · · ·
p113q
1
31 p
1
13q
2
31 p
1
13(1− q131 − q231)− 1 · · ·
p121q
1
12 p
1
21q
2
12 p
1
21(1− q112 − q212) · · ·
...
...
...
p133q
1
33 p
1
33q
2
33 p
1
33(1− q133 − q233) · · ·

Finally, the row corresponding to the plays jk of (M ′|f) has entries
p1jkq
1
kj , . . . , p
1
jkq
d
kj , p
2
jkq
1
kj , . . . , p
j
jkq
k
kj − 1, . . . , pdjkq1kj , . . . , pdjkqd−1kj , fjk,
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and continuing to illustrate this with d = 3, we have
(M ′|f) =

p111q
1
11 − 1 p111q211 p111(1− q111 − q211) · · · , f11
p112q
1
21 p
1
12q
2
21 − 1 p112(1− q121 − q221) · · · , f12
p113q
1
31 p
1
13q
2
31 p
1
13(1− q131 − q231)− 1 · · · , f13
p121q
1
12 p
1
21q
2
12 p
1
21(1− q112 − q212) · · · , f21
...
...
...
p133q
1
33 p
1
33q
2
33 p
1
33(1− q133 − q233) · · · , f33

Thus, the sum of the first d entries of the jkth row of (M ′|f) is
d∑
l=1
p1jkq
l
kj − kj,1l =

p1jk − 1 if j = 1
p1jk otherwise
Similarly for the second d entries, and so on. Thus, if for each a = 1, . . . , d− 1, we replace the adth
column by the sum of columns (a − 1)d, (a − 1)d + 1, . . . , (a − 1)d + d − 1, a transformation that
leaves det((M ′|f)) unchanged, the resulting matrix has a adth column with jkth entry

pajk − 1 if j = a
pajk otherwise
i.e. the adth column depends only on player 1, and player 1 controls d − 1 columns. Proceeding
similarly, we see that player 2 also controls exactly d− 1 columns.
To see this concretely, for d = 3, if we replace the third column of (M ′|f) by the third column
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plus the first and the second (which preserves the determinant), we get
˜(M ′|f) =

p111q
1
11 − 1 p111q211 p111 − 1 · · · , f11
p112q
1
21 p
1
12q
2
21 − 1 p112 − 1 · · · , f12
p113q
1
31 p
1
13q
2
31 p
1
13 − 1 · · · , f13
p121q
1
12 p
1
21q
2
12 p
1
21 · · · , f21
...
...
...
p133q
1
33 p
1
33q
2
33 p
1
33 · · · , f33

(2)
Thus, player 1 controls the third column of ˜(M ′|f) with their probabilities of playing choice 1.
Similarly replacing column 6 with the sum of columns 4, 5, and 6, we get a new column 6 with
entries
p211, p
2
12, p
2
13, p
2
21 − 1, p222 − 1, p223 − 1, p231, p232, p233
to conclude that player 1 controls 2 columns.
1.1 Memory in multi-choice games
In this section we repeat the argument of Appendix A of [1], which tells us that if player 1 has
memory m1 and player 2 has memory m2 > m1, then for any strategy played by player 2, there is
a memory m1 strategy that will yield the same expected payoff. Thus, in an evolving population,
if player 1 can resist invasion against all invaders with memory m1 she can also resist invasion
against all invaders of memory m2 > m1, and in particular strategies with memory-1 that are
robust against all other memory-1 strategies are also robust against all longer-memory strategies.
This argument should be qualified by clarifying that the expected payoff refers to expectation
with respect to all possible histories (as opposed to, say, expectation conditional on a given history
of play). Let Hn denote the history of plays up until the nth round, and let S1(n), S2(n) denote
the strategy played by player 1 and 2 respectively in the nth round. S1(n) and S2(n) are non-
anticipating random variables, so that S1(n+ 1) and S2(n+ 1) are independent conditional on the
prior history of play Hn.
8
That player i has memory mi is the statement that
E[Si(n)|Hn] = E [Si(n)|(S1(n− 1), S2(n− 1)), . . . , (S1(n−mi), S2(n−mi))] ,
where E denotes the expectation with respect to the joint probability distribution for the pair of
random variables S1(n), S2(n) (here we are marginalizing over the second player). We note that
this is an identity, depending only on the memory of the players, and is independent of the further
specifics of the underlying joint probability distribution.
Now, let S˜2 be a random variable such that
P
(
S˜2(n) = s
∣∣∣(S1(n− 1), S2(n− 1)), . . . , (S1(n−m1), S2(n−m1)))
= E [P (S2(n) = s|(S1(n− 1), S2(n− 1)), . . . , (S1(n−m2), S2(n−m2)))] ,
where the expectation is over the outcomes of the plays (S1(n − m1), S2(n − m1)), . . . , (S1(n −
m2), S2(n−m2)) i.e.we are defining a new probability distribution by marginalising over all history
longer than the shorter memory of player 1. Then S˜2 is a memory m1 strategy and it is shown
in [1] that player 1 has the same payoff playing against the new player S˜2 as against the original
opponent playing S2. Since the definition of equilibrium in an evolving population depends only
on the expected payoff, this tells us that we may equally well determine whether the strategy of
player 1 is an equilibrium by considering the payoff off the modified strategy S˜2 playing against the
shorter memory player 1.
2 Coordinate system for memory-1 strategies in multi-choice games
In this section we construct a coordinate system for memory-1 strategies under a d-choice action
space. The advantage of the coordinate system we construct is that it allows us to write the
longterm average payoffs received by the two players in a simple relationship, which can in turn
be used to determine whether a particular resident strategy in an evolving population can resist
invasion, and thus be “evolutionary robust” [2, 3]. We present our results for repeated games with
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discounting factor δ, which can be understood as meaning either that the game is repeated after
each round with probability δ, or that the game is assuredly repeated but the payoff received in
each round is reduced by a factor δ [4, 5]. Regardless of the interpretation of δ the results are the
same. We first define the coordinate system, and we then use it to determine a simple relationship
between two players’ expected scores. Finally we explicitly write down the relationship between the
new coordinate system and the more standard coordinate system in which strategies are expressed
as probabilities pijk (probability of playing action i given that the focal player played j and her
opponent played k in the preceding round).
Consider a d-choice, two-player game with strategy (p1,p2, . . .,pd) where each pi is a vector
of d2 probabilities, each corresponding to the probability that a player makes choice i in the next
round given the outcome of the preceding round. In addition we must also specify the play in
the first round, which we denote p0i , i.e. the probability that a player makes choice i at time 0.
Each vector pi is composed of d2 coordinates pijk. These coordinates specify a point in “strategy
space” i. Each action i thus has it’s own “strategy space”, however, by definition, any realizable
strategy must satisfy
∑
i p
i
jk = 1,∀j, k ∈ D, where D is the set of possible choices in the game.
Each strategy space is thus composed of d2 basis vectors eijk, with each direction corresponding
to a different outcome jk of the preceding round. We wish to construct an alternate coordinate
system for this strategy space. In order to do so we must choose a new set of d2 vectors that form
a basis Rd2 . We make our choice as follows: in directions that correspond to both players behaving
the same way in the previous round (i.e. j = k) we retain the old coordinates. In directions that
correspond to players making different choices in the preceding round, we choose a new pair of
orthogonal vectors in directions eijk + e
i
kj and e
i
jk − eikj . This provides us with an alternate basis
for each strategy space i. Under this new coordinate system a strategy vector pi for playing choice
i is written as
pi =
∑
k
eiik −
∑
j
[
Λ+jje
i
jj +
∑
k>j
Λ+jk(e
i
jk + e
i
kj) + Λ
−
jk(e
i
jk − eikj)
]
. (3)
Writing a strategy in this way, Eqs. 1 and 2 tell us that the following equality must hold
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d∑
i=1
Λ+iivii + d∑
j=i+1
Λ+ij(vij + vji) + Λ
−
ij(vij − vji)
 = 0
where vij is the equilibrium rate of the play ij, with the focal player’s move is listed first. It is Eq.3
that we will use to derive our relationship between two player’s average payoffs.
2.1 The average payoff received by the two players
In this section we derive a relationship between the average payoffs received by two players X and
Y , given that player X uses strategy pi when choosing to play action i, which we write in terms of
the alternate coordinate system defined in the preceding section. Similarly, we assume that player
Y uses strategy qi when choosing to play action i. Let the expected payoff to a focal player X and
her opponent Y be Sxy and Syx respectively (we adopt the convention that, when referring to an
evolving population, we use player labels X and Y rather than 1 and 2 as in the previous section).
Furthermore let the probability that the play jk occurs in round t of the repeated game be vtjk.
In an iterated game the probability of play ij in round t+ 1 is given by
vt+1ij =
∑
k
∑
l
vtklp
i
klq
j
lk
where pikl is the probability that the focal play plays i given that she played k and her opponent
played l in the preceding round and qjlk is the equivalent quantity for her opponent. We must also
specify an initial condition, which is the probability the each pair of plays jk in the first round,
v0jk. This probability is given by simply v
0
jk = p
0
jq
0
k where p
0
j is the probability that the focal player
makes choice j in the first round and q0k is the probability that her opponent makes choice k. Using
our assumed coordinate transform for p, Eq. 3, we recover
vt+1ij = −
∑
k
(
Λ+kkv
t
kkq
j
kk +
∑
l>k
Λ+kl(v
t
klq
j
lk + v
t
lkq
j
kl) + Λ
−
kl(v
t
klq
j
lk − vtlkqjkl)
)
+
∑
l
vtilq
j
li
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We can now sum over j, the choice made by player Y, to give
∑
j
(vt+1ij − vtij) = −
∑
k
(
Λ+kkv
t
kk +
∑
l>k
Λ+kl(v
t
kl + v
t
lk) + Λ
−
kl(v
t
kl − vtlk)
)
.
If we now sum over t, from the first round up to round τ we get
∑
j
(vτij − v0ij) = −
τ∑
t=0
∑
k
(
Λ+kkv
t
kk +
∑
l>k
Λ+kl(v
t
kl + v
t
lk) + Λ
−
kl(v
t
kl − vtlk)
)
(4)
Here we note that ∑
j
v0ij = p
0
i
where p0i is the probability of using i as the initial play for player X. Equation 4 now allows us to
calculate the expected payoffs to both players as a function of their strategy. Assuming a rate of
discounting δ, and summing over all rounds from t = 0 to infinity, we can now write
∑
j
∞∑
t=0
δt(1− δ)vtij − p0i = −δ
∞∑
t=0
δt
∑
k
(
Λ+kkv
t
kk +
∑
l>k
Λ+kl(v
t
kl + v
t
lk) + Λ
−
kl(v
t
kl − vtlk)
)
(5)
Now note that, with discounting, the sum of the two players scores are given by
Sxy + Syx = (1− δ)
d∑
i=1
∞∑
t
δt
2Riivtii + d∑
j=i+1
(Rij +Rji)(v
t
ij + v
t
ji)

and the difference between the two player’s scores by
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Sxy − Syx = (1− δ)
d∑
i=1
d∑
j=i
∞∑
t
δt(Rij −Rji)(vtij − vtji)
This suggests the following strategy for choice i:
Λ+ii = (φ− χ)Rii − (φ− χ)κ+ λiii −
1− δ
δ
Λ−ii = 0
Λ+ij =
φ− χ
2
(Rij +Rji)− (φ− χ)κ+ (λiij + λiji)/2−
1− δ
2δ
Λ−ij = −
φ+ χ
2
(Rij −Rji) + (λiij − λiji)/2−
1− δ
2δ
Λ+kl =
φ− χ
2
(Rkl +Rkl)− (φ− χ)κ+ (λikl + λilk)/2
Λ−kl = −
φ+ χ
2
(Rkl −Rkl) + (λikl − λilk)/2
(6)
for all terms j, k 6= i. Replacing this in Eq. 5 now leaves us with
φiSyx − χiSxy − (φi − χi)κi +
d∑
k=1
d∑
l=1
λikl
∑
t
(1− δ)δtvtkl −
1− δ
δ
p0i = 0 (7)
Of course there are d − 1 such equations for each choice i (rather than d equations, due to the
constraint that the probability of playing any possible action must sum to 1), and any linear
combination of these d− 1 equation must also hold. Notice that we now have three extraneous Λ
parameters. In general it is convenient to choose λ11 = λdd = 0 and λ1d = λd1, however other, more
convenient choices might be made depending on the payoff structure of the game being considered.
Equation 7 gives us the discrete version of the relationship in McAvoy & Hauert [5], genralized to
the full space of memory-1 strategies. For notational convenience we now write
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∞∑
t
(1− δ)δtvtkl = vkl
which is the equilibrium rate of the play kl in a game with discounting. This gives us the following
equalities
φiSyx − χiSxy − (φi − χi)κi +
d∑
k=1
d∑
l=1
λiklvkl −
1− δ
δ
p0i = 0 (8)
for the relationship between the equilibrium payoffs given the strategy of player X, where we recall
that p0i denotes the probability that the focal player makes choice i in the first round of play. Notice
that, with the introduction of discounting, Eq. 8 depends on the probability of X playing i in the
first round.
In our simplified notation we can also write
Sxy + Syx =
d∑
i=1
2Riivtii + d∑
j=i+1
(Rij +Rji)(vij + vji)
 (9)
and
Sxy − Syx =
d∑
i=1
d∑
j=i
(Rij −Rji)(vij − vji) (10)
For the sum and the difference of the two player’s payoffs, which will be useful in the next section.
We now use this coordinate system and the equality Eq. 8 that it allows us to derive in order
to analyse two multi-choice cases of particular interest: two-choice strategies playing against multi-
choice invaders in a public goods game, and multi-choice strategies playing against single choice
invaders in a rock-paper scissors game.
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3 Robust strategies in multi-choice public goods games
In this section we determine the conditions for a two-choice strategy to able to resist invasion by any
rare mutant in an evolving population of N individuals playing pairwise public goods games. Under
a multi-choice public goods game, a pair of players who choose to invest Cj and Ck respectively in
a given round of play generate a total benefit Bjk such that the player who invested Cj receives
payoff
Rjk = Bjk/2− Cj
We focus on strategies that use only two investment levels, C1 and C2 > C1. We determine whether
a strategy which, when resident in a population, stabalizes investment at either C1 or C2, can resist
invasion by players with access to arbitrary investment levels. We then investigate particular cases
of two choice strategies that react to investment levels other than C1 and C2 according to a threshold
rule.
We are interested in whether a two-choice strategy can be evolutionary robust against an invader
who can vary his investment level in an arbitrary way. Thus we assume a focal strategy that can
invest either C1 or C2. We assume λ11 = λ22 = 0 and λ12 = λ21. When faced with an opponent
who plays with d investment levels, the two-choice player may in general have 2d probabilities for
investing at level C2:
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p211 = − ((φ− χ)(B11/2− κ)− φC1 + χC1)
p212 = − ((φ− χ)(B12/2− κ)− φC2 + χC1 + λ12)
p213 = − ((φ− χ)(B13/2− κ)− φC3 + χC1 + λ13)
...
p21d = − ((φ− χ)(B1d/2− κ)− φCd + χC1 + λ1d)
p221 =
1
δ
− ((φ− χ)(B12/2− κ)− φC1 + χC2 + λ12)
p222 =
1
δ
− ((φ− χ)(B22/2− κ)− φC2 + χC2)
p223 =
1
δ
− ((φ− χ)(B23/2− κ)− φC3 + χC2 + λ23)
...
p12d =
1
δ
− ((φ− χ)(B2d/2− κ)− φCd + χC2 + λ2d)
where p1jk = 1− p2jk. The resulting relationship between players’ scores is given by
φSyx − χSxy − (φ− χ)κ+ λ12(v12 + v21) +
d∑
j=3
(λ1jv1j + λ2jv2j) =
1− δ
δ
p02 (11)
We can observe immediately that the first four terms of Eq. 11 correspond to the type of two-choice
games that have been studied extensively elsewhere.
Looking at the sum and difference between players’ scores in this game we find
Sxy+Syx = (B11−2C1)v11+(B22−2C2)v22+(B12−C1−C2)(v12+v12)+
d∑
j=3
(B1j−C1−Cj)v1j+(B2j−C2−Cj)v2j
(12)
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and
Sxy − Syx = (C2 − C1)(v12 − v21) +
d∑
j=3
(Cj − C1)v1j + (Cj − C2)v2j (13)
In the next section we will use Eqs. 11-13 to derive conditions for evolutionary robustness of the
resident strategy.
3.1 Robustness of strategies that stabalize investment at level C2
Now let us focus on a resident, two-choice strategy who can invest either C1 or C2 where C1 < C2,
and which stabalizes cooperation investment at C2 when resident in a population, i.e. a strategy
such that p222 = 1 which in turn implies that κ = B22/2 − C2 − 1φ−χ 1−δδ . Notice that in order to
ensure investment is stabalized at C2 in the presence of discounting, the strategy must have p
2
0 = 1,
i.e. players must always invest C2 in the first round. Such a strategy always invests C2 in the first
round and always invests C2 if both players invested C2 in the preceding round. In general, when
resident in a population, such a strategy ensures all players invest C2 at equilibrium.
From Eqs. 12 and 13 we can set upper and lower bounds on players scores such that
Sxy + Syx ≤ (B22 − 2C2) + (B21 + C2 − C1 −B22)(v12 + v12)
+
d∑
j=3
(B2j + C2 − Cj −B22)v2j + (B1j − C1 − Cj −B22 + 2C2)v1j (14)
which becomes an equality when v11 = 0, and
Sxy + Syx ≥ (B11 − 2C1) + (B21 − C2 + C1 −B11)(v12 + v12)
+
d∑
j=3
(B2j − C2 − Cj −B11 + 2C1)v2j + (B1j + C1 − Cj −B11)v1j (15)
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which becomes an equality when v22 = 0, and
Sxy − Syx ≥ −(C2 − C1)(v12 + v21) +
d∑
j=3
(Cj − C1)v1j + (Cj − C2)v2j (16)
which becomes an equality when an opponent never invests C1 and
Sxy − Syx ≤ (C2 − C1)(v12 + v21) +
d∑
j=3
(Cj − C1)v1j + (Cj − C2)v2j (17)
which becomes an equality when an opponent never invests C2.
In order for a rare mutant Y to invade a population with a resident X we must have
Syx >
N − 2
N − 1(B22/2− C2) +
1
N − 1Sxy. (18)
This condition means that selection favors the rare mutant over the resident strategy. Our goal is
to identify strategies that resist invasion by all possible mutants, which we call evolutionary robust
strategies. The condition above is related to the ESSN condition for a resident strategy to be
stable against invasion and replacement by a mutant in a finite population [6]. However, since we
are concerned only with strong selection we focus on the invasion condition alone. Furthermore,
we discuss our results in terms of the evolutionary robustness of strategies, (i.e. those that cannot
be selectively invaded) because, in the large space of memory-1 strategies, no strategy is strictly
stable because all strategies can be replaced neutrally by drift. The best that can be achieved is
robustness, i.e. the ability to resist selective invasion [3]. Combining the expression above with
Eq. 11 we obtain.
(
χ− φ 1
N − 1
)
(Sxy − (B22/2− C2)) > λ12(v12 + v21) +
d∑
j=3
(λ1jv1j + λ2jv2j) (19)
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Combining this with Eq. 14 and Eq. 16 we derive two conditions that together are necessary and
sufficient for evolutionary robustness. Firstly, if (N − 1)χ > φ we have
N
N − 1
λ12(v12 + v21) + d∑
j=3
(λ1jv1j + λ2jv2j)
 >
(
χ− φ 1
N − 1
)[
(B21 + C2 − C1 −B22)(v12 + v12)
+
d∑
j=3
(B2j + C2 − Cj −B22)v2j + (B1j − C1 − Cj −B22 + 2C2)v1j
]
(20)
which means that in order to ensure robustness we must have
N
N − 1 (λij) > −
(
χ− φ 1
N − 1
)
(B22 − 2C2 −Bij + Ci + Cj) (21)
We also retrieve a second inequality when (N − 1)χ < φ:
N − 2
N − 1λ12(v12 + v21) +
N − 2
N − 1
d∑
j=3
(λ1jv1j + λ2jv2j)
> −
(
χ− φ 1
N − 1
)(C2 − C1)(v12 + v21)− d∑
j=3
(Cj − C2)v2j + (Cj − C1)v1j
 (22)
which means that in order to ensure robustness we must also have
N − 2
N − 1λij >
(
χ− φ 1
N − 1
)
(Cj − Ci), ∀j > 2 (23)
This second condition is always hardest to satisfy when Cj is minimized.
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The first condition depends on how benefits change with investment. If we assume Bij =
r(Ci + Cj)
α we get
N
N − 1λij >
(
χ− φ 1
N − 1
)
(r(2C2)
α − 2C2 − r(Ci + Cj)α + (Ci + Cj))
which is hardest to satisfy when the right hand side is maximized. When this occurs depends in
general on the choice of α, but if α = 1 this condition is also hardest to satisfy when Cj = 0. We
can convert Eq. 20-23 back to the original coordinate system, i.e write conditions for robustness
in terms of the probability pijk of playing choice i given the outcome of the preceding round. This
yields the following set of two-choice strategies that are evolutionary robust against all possible
mutants and stabalize investment level at C2 when resident in a population:
Cd2 =
{
(p11, p12, . . . , p1d, p21, p22, . . . , p2d)
∣∣∣∣p22 = 1,
p2j < 1− N − 2
N
(1 + p12 − p21)C2 − Cj
C2 − C1
[
N − 1
N − 2 −
r
2
]
,
p1j +
1− δ
δ
<
N − 2
N
(1 + p12 − p21)
[
r
2
−
(
N − 1
N − 2 −
r
2
)
C2 − Cj
C2 − C1 +
1
N − 2
]
,
p2j < 1− p11
r − 1
C2 − Cj
C2 − C1
[
N − 1
N − 2 −
r
2
]
p1j +
1− δ
δ
<
p11
r − 1
[
r
2
−
(
N − 1
N − 2 −
r
2
)
C2 − Cj
C2 − C1 +
1
N − 2
]}
,
(24)
Finally, in order for a robust strategy to exist it must be both viable and belong to the set described
by Eq. 24. The relevant values of r (i.e. those that produce a social dilemma in the public goods
game) are those in the range 1 ≤ r ≤ 2. Thus p2j can always be chosen to be both viable and
robust. However p1j can only be chosen to be both viable and robust in all cases if
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1− δ
δ
< 2
N − 2
N
[
r
2
−
(
N − 1
N − 2 −
r
2
)
C2 − Cj
C2 − C1 +
1
N − 2
]
and
1− δ
δ
<
1
r − 1
[
r
2
−
(
N − 1
N − 2 −
r
2
)
C2 − Cj
C2 − C1 +
1
N − 2
]
are satisfied. The first condition is only the more stringent in general for values N < 4, thus we
calculate conditions for strategies to be viable under the second condition. This gives
(r − 1)(2δ − 1)
δ r2 + δ
1
N−2 − (1− δ)(r − 1)
>
C1
C2
(25)
as the condition which must be satisfied in large population (N > 4) in order for a robust two-choice
strategy to exist, i.e. in order for the set Cd2 to be non-empty.
3.2 Robustness of strategies that stabalize investment at level C1
In this section we repeat the results of the preceding section for strategies that stabalize investment
at level C1, i.e. those which have p11 = 0, which implies κ = B11 − C1 and p02 = 0. In order for a
rare mutant Y to invade a population with a resident X we must have
Syx >
N − 2
N − 1(B11/2− C1) +
1
N − 1Sxy (26)
Combining this with Eq. 11 we then get
(
χ− φ 1
N − 1
)
(Sxy − (B11/2− C1)) > λ12(v12 + v21) +
d∑
j=3
(λ1jv1j + λ2jv2j) (27)
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Combining this with Eq. 15 and Eq. 17 we then get two conditions for evolutionary robustness,
firstly, when (N − 1)χ < φ we find
N − 2
N − 1
λ12(v12 + v21) + d∑
j=3
(λ1jv1j + λ2jv2j)
 >
(
χ− φ 1
N − 1
)[
(B21 + C1 − C2 −B11)(v12 + v12)
+
d∑
j=3
(B2j − C2 − Cj −B11 + 2C1)v2j + (B1j + C1 − Cj −B11)v1j
]
(28)
which means that in order to ensure robustness we must have
N − 2
N − 1 (λij) >
(
χ− φ 1
N − 1
)
(B11 − 2C1 −Bij + Ci + Cj) (29)
We also retrieve a second inequality when (N − 1)χ > φ:
N
N − 1λ12(v12 + v21) +
N
N − 1
d∑
j=3
(λ1jv1j + λ2jv2j)
>
(
χ− φ 1
N − 1
)(C2 − C1)(v12 + v21) + d∑
j=3
(Cj − C2)v2j + (Cj − C1)v1j
 (30)
which means that in order to ensure robustness we must also have
N
N − 1λij >
(
χ− φ 1
N − 1
)
(Cj − Ci), ∀j > 2 (31)
Assuming a linear publics goods game, the first in equality is hardest to satisfy when Cj = 0.
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However the second in equality is hardest to satisfy when Cj in maximized. This latter result
is important because it illustrates the instability of extortionate strategies in larger populations.
Extortion strategies have λij = 0 and χ > 0. Our results show that two-choice extortion strategies
are never universally robust, and are vulnerable to invaders who contribute more than them to the
public good.
3.3 Two-choice strategies with thresholds
In this section we consider the robustness of two choice strategies that stabalize investment at C2
when resident in a population, but are constrained in their ability to “perceive” an invader who
invests at a level C 6= {C1, C2}. Such a case is highly relevant because it is natural to assume that a
player who is limited in her bility to access a large action space may also be limited in her ability to
perceive actions that she cannot access. The most natural case of limited perception is to assume
that the focal, two-choice player, reacts to all of her opponents plays as though they are investments
at either level C1 or C2. Thus her strategy consists of only four probabilities, {p11, p12, p21, p22}
as well as a probability of investing C2 in the first round, p
0
2. We assume that this player uses
a threshold in her perception of her opponent’s investment, whereby an opponent’s investment of
C < CT results in her treating his play as an investment of C1 and otherwise she treats it as an
investment of C2. Clearly C1 ≤ CT ≤ C2 is the most realistic case.
Returning to the case of a resident strategy that stabalizes investment at level C2 we see from
Eq. 24 that, for values of CT < C2 the strategy cannot be robust (since these conditions imply that
p22 < 1 whereas a strategies that stabalize investment at C2 have p22 = 1 by definition). However
if we select a threshold CT = C2 we retrieve the following conditions for robusntess (for δ = 1):
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p12
C2
C2 − C1
[
N − 1
N − 2 −
r
2
]
< (1− p21)
[
N
N − 2 −
C2
C2 − C1
N − 1
N − 2 +
r
2
C2
C2 − C1
]
,
p11 <
N − 2
N
(1 + p12 − p21)
[
r
2
−
(
N − 1
N − 2 −
r
2
)
C2
C2 − C1 +
1
N − 2
]
,
1− p21 > p11
r − 1
C2
C2 − C1
[
N − 1
N − 2 −
r
2
]
C1
C2
<
(r − 1)
r
2 +
1
N−2
(32)
All of these can be satisfied for some choice of {p11, p12, p21} provided the final condition is satisfied.
However this is precisely the condition for universal robustness given in section 1, in the case δ = 1.
We have also verified this condition via simulation (Fig. S1). Note that in order to derive these
conditions only Eq. 25 is required, and the same procedure can be repeated to determine whether
any “perception scheme” of interest can produce a universally robust strategy.
4 Games with non-transitive payoff structures
In this final section we consider the rock-paper-scissors game, which is a three-choice, non-transitive
game. We write down the coordinate transform for the three-choice non-transitive game and we
show that in general no ZD strategies can exist. We also determine the conditions for a mixed
strategy (one that makes use of all three choices) to be invaded by a pure strategy, which uses
only a single type of play. In this way we asses the ability of a population to maintain behavioral
diversity.
We assume a payoff structure R13 = B − C1, R21 = B − C2, R32 = B − C3, R31 = −C3,
R12 = −C1 and R23 = −C2 which gives a non-transitive relationship between the choices 1=rock,
2=paper and 3=scissors. We assume that when two players make the same choice they receive
equal payoff: R11 = B/2− C1, R22 = B/2− C1 and R33 = B/2− C1. In the alternate coordinate
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system without discounting (δ = 1), a strategy is written as
p111 = 1− (φ1 − χ1)
(
B/2− C1 − κ1
)
p112 = 1−
(
φ1(B − C2) + χ1C1 − (φ1 − χ1)κ1
)
p113 = 1 +
(
φ1C3 + χ
1(B − C1) + (φ1 − χ1)κ1
)
p121 = λ
1
21 +
(
φ1C2 + χ
1(B − C1) + (φ1 − χ1)κ1
)
p122 = λ
1
22 − (φ1 − χ1)
(
B/2− C2 − κ1
)
p123 = λ
1
23 −
(
φ1(B − C3) + χ1C2 − (φ1 − χ1)κ1
)
p131 = λ
1
31 −
(
φ1(B − C1) + χ1C3 − (φ1 − χ1)κ1
)
p132 = λ
1
32 +
(
φ1C2 + χ
1(B − C3) + (φ1 − χ1)κ1
)
p133 = λ
1
33 − (φ1 − χ1)
(
B/2− C3 − κ1
)
and
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p211 = λ
2
11 − (φ2 − χ2)
(
B/2− C1 − κ2
)
p212 = λ
2
12 −
(
φ2(B − C2) + χ2C1 − (φ2 − χ2)κ2
)
p213 = λ
2
13 +
(
φ2C3 + χ
2(B − C1) + (φ2 − χ2)κ2
)
p221 = 1 +
(
φ2C2 + χ
2(B − C1) + (φ2 − χ2)κ2
)
p222 = 1− (φ2 − χ2)
(
B/2− C2 − κ2
)
p223 = 1−
(
φ2(B − C3) + χ2C2 − (φ2 − χ2)κ2
)
p231 = λ
2
31 −
(
φ2(B − C1) + χ2C3 − (φ2 − χ2)κ2
)
p232 = λ
2
32 +
(
φ2C2 + χ
2(B − C3) + (φ2 − χ2)κ2
)
p233 = λ
2
33 − (φ2 − χ2)
(
B/2− C3 − κ2
)
where we set λ = 0 for the case where a player uses the same move as she played in the preceding
round. If we consider the symmetrical case C1 = C2 = C3 we can set
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poo = 1− (φ− χ) (B/2− C − κ)
p−− = 1− (φ(B − C) + χC − (φ− χ)κ)
p++ = 1 + (φC + χ(B − C) + (φ− χ)κ)
po+ = λ
o
+ + (φC + χ(B − C) + (φ− χ)κ)
p−o = λ
−
o − (φ− χ) (B/2− C − κ)
p+− = λ
+
− − (φ(B − C) + χC − (φ− χ)κ)
po− = λ
o
− − (φ(B − C) + χC − (φ− χ)κ)
p−+ = λ
−
+ + (φC + χ(B − C) + (φ− χ)κ)
p+o = λ
+
o − (φ− χ) (B/2− C − κ)
where subscript indicates the outcome of the preceding round: win (+), lose (-) or draw (o) and
the superscript refers to the choice to switch to the move that would have resulted in that outcome
in the preceding round. Note also that by definition p+o + p
−
o + p
o
o = 1 etc so that the following
must hold:
λ−o + λ
+
o = 3(φ− χ) (B/2− C − κ)
λo+ + λ
−
+ = −3 (φC + χ(B − C) + (φ− χ)κ)
λ+− + λ
o
− = 3 (φ(B − C) + χC − (φ− χ)κ) (33)
Against an opponent who only plays rock=1, the following relationships between players scores
must hold
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φSyx − χSxy − (φ− χ)κ+ λo+v21 + λo−v31 = 0
φSyx − χSxy − (φ− χ)κ+ λ+o v11 + λ+−v31 = 0
φSyx − χSxy − (φ− χ)κ+ λ−o v11 + λ−+v21 = 0
(34)
with equivalent equalities for invaders who only play paper or scissors, which we can ignore due to
the assumed symmetry of the problem.
Finally, note that in the totally symmetrical game the sum of both players longterm average
payoffs is constant:
Sxy + Syx = B − 2C (35)
and in order for a mutant to successfully invade therefore requires
Syx >
N − 2
N − 1(B/2− C) +
1
N − 1Sxy
which in turn implies
B/2− C > Sxy
Combining Eqs. 33-35 we can now solve for v and arrive at the following inequality as the condition
for a strategy to maintain behavioral diversity in the symmetrical rock-paper-scissors game:
p−o (1− p−− − p−+) > p+o (1− p++ − p+−) (36)
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Figure 1: The volume of universally robust two-choice strategies for the linear public goods game, with a
threshold perception model. We consider two-choice strategies that can invest either C1 or C2 > C1 and that
stabilize investment at C2 when resident in a population. We compete these strategies against opponents
with access to arbitrary investment levels, but we assumed that the resident two-choice strategy reacts to
all opponents as though they have invested either C1 or C2, treating investments C ≥ C2 as an investment
of C2 and treating everything else as an investment of C1. We drew 10
6 random resident strategies for each
value of the benefit scaling factor r and investment reduction C1 (keeping C2 = 1 fixed). We competed
each strategy against 106 invaders who use three investment levels C∗1 = 0, C1 < C
∗
2 < C2 and C
∗
3 > C2,
where we draw C∗2 ∈ [C1, C2] and C∗3 ∈ [C2, 10C2] uniformly for each invader. From this we calculated the
volume of robust two-choice strategies, i.e. the probability that a random two-choice strategy of this type
can resist all simulated invaders. The white region indicates parameters for which no strategy was found to
be robust, in good agreement with the analytical prediction (black line, Eq. 3). Simulations were conducted
with population size N = 100 with selection strength σ = 10.
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